A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution by Nir Dagan et al.
Soc Choice Welfare (2002) 19: 811–823
A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
Nir Dagan1, Oscar Volij2, Eyal Winter3
1 Academic Priority Ltd., Rashi 31, 52015 Ramat-Gan, Israel
(e-mail: nir@nirdagan.com; http://www.nirdagan.com)
2 Department of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames,
Iowa 50011, USA (e-mail address: oscar@volij.co.il; http://volij.co.il)
3 Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
(e-mail: mseyal@mscc.huji.ac.il. Web site: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~eyalw/)
Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001
Abstract. We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms:
Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Dis-
agreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpre-
tation to this last axiom.
1 Introduction
Since Nash (1950), a bargaining problem is usually deﬁned as a pair ðS;dÞ
where S is a compact, convex subset of R2 containing both d and a point that
strictly dominates d. Points in S are interpreted as feasible utility agreements
and d represents the status-quo outcome. A bargaining solution is a rule that
assigns a feasible agreement to each bargaining problem. Nash (1950) pro-
posed four independent properties and showed that they are simultaneously
satisﬁed only by the Nash bargaining solution.
While three of Nash’s axioms are quite uncontroversial, the fourth one
(known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)) raised some criticisms,
which lead to two di¤erent lines of research. Some authors looked for char-
acterizations of alternative solutions which do not use the controversial axiom
(see for instance, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), and Perles and Maschler
(1981)) while other papers provided alternative characterizations of the Nash
solution without appealing to the IIA axiom. Examples of this second line of
research are Peters (1986b), Chun and Thomson (1990), Peters and van Damme
(1991), Mariotti (1999), Mariotti (2000), and Lensberg (1988). The ﬁrst three
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comments.papers replace IIA by several axioms in conjunction with some type of conti-
nuity. The next two papers replace IIA and other axioms by one axiom. Lastly,
Lensberg (1988) replaces IIA with consistency, and consequently a domain
with a variable number of agents is needed.
In this paper, we provide an alternative characterization of the Nash
bargaining solution in which the axiom of independence of irrelevant alter-
natives is replaced by three di¤erent axioms. While all three of these axioms
are known in the literature, they have never been used in combination. One
of the axioms is independence of non-individually rational alternatives, which
requires a solution to be insensitive to changes in the feasible set that involve
only non-individually rational outcomes. This axiom neither implies nor is
implied by IIA, but is weaker than IIA and Individual Rationality together.1
The second axiom is twisting, which is a weak monotonicity requirement that
is implied by IIA. The third axiom is disagreement point convexity which re-
quires that the solution be insensitive to movements of the disagreement point
towards the proposed compromise. This last axiom does not imply nor is
implied by IIA. Further, the three axioms together do not imply IIA.
All of the axioms used in this paper have a straightforward interpreta-
tion except, perhaps, for disagreement point convexity. This axiom, however,
has an interpretation that is closely related to non-cooperative models of bar-
gaining. Assume that the solution recommends fðS;dÞ when the bargaining
problem is ðS;dÞ. The players may postpone the resolution of the bargaining
for t periods getting fðS;dÞ only after t periods of disagreement. From today’s
point of view, knowing that one has the alternative of reaching agreement
t periods later is as if the new disagreement point was fðS;dÞ paid t periods
later. Disagreement point convexity requires that the solution be insensitive to
this kind of manipulation.
Our result, though not its proof, is closely related to Peters and van
Damme (1991). The main di¤erence is that we replace their disagreement point
continuity axiom by the twisting axiom. In this way, we get rid of a mainly
technical axiom and replace it by a more intuitive and reasonable one. Need-
less to say, disagreement point continuity and twisting, are not equivalent.
Further, neither of them implies the other.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we present the preliminary
deﬁnitions and the axioms used in the characterization. Section 3 gives the
main result. Section 4 shows that the axioms are independent. Finally, Sect. 5
discusses the related literature.
2 Basic deﬁnitions
In this section, we present some basic deﬁnitions. Since most of them are stan-
dard, we do not provide their interpretation.
1 A solution is individually rational if it assigns each player a utility level that is not
lower than its disagreement level. See next section.
812 N. Dagan et al.A bargaining problem is a pair ðS;dÞ where S JR2 is a compact, convex
set, d A S and there is s A S with sgd.2 We denote by B the set of all bargain-
ing problems. A bargaining solution is a set-valued function f : B ! 2R2
nq
such that for every bargaining problem B ¼ð S;dÞ, fðBÞJS. We allow for
set-valued solutions to highlight the role of some of the axioms in the present
characterization. Let ðS;dÞ be a bargaining problem. We say that s A S is in-
dividually rational if sbd. We say that s A S is weakly e‰cient if there is no
s0 A S such that s0 gs and that s is e‰cient if there is no s0 A S, s0 0s, such
that s0 bs. We denote by IRðS;dÞ the set of individually rational points in
ðS;dÞ.
The Nash bargaining solution is the solution n : B ! 2R2
nq that for each
bargaining problem ðS;dÞ selects the singleton fðs 
1;s 
2ÞgJS that contains the
only point in IRðS;dÞ which satisﬁes ðs 
1   d1Þðs 
2   d2Þbðs1   d1Þðs2   d2Þ,
for all ðs1;s2Þ A IRðS;dÞ.
We now turn to properties of bargaining solutions.
A bargaining problem ðS;dÞ is symmetric if
. d1 ¼ d2 and . ðs1;s2Þ A S implies ðs2;s1Þ A S.
We say that ðS0;d 0Þ is obtained from the bargaining problem ðS;dÞ by the
transformations si ! aisi þ bi, for i ¼ 1;2, if d 0
i ¼ aidi þ bi, for i ¼ 1;2 and
S0 ¼f ð a1s1 þ b1;a2s2 þ b2Þ A R2 : ðs1;s2Þ A Sg:
The following properties are standard:
Symmetry. A bargaining solution f satisﬁes symmetry if for all symmetric
bargaining problems ðS;dÞ,
ðs1;s2Þ A fðS;dÞ,ð s2;s1Þ A fðS;dÞ:
Weak Pareto optimality. A bargaining solution f satisﬁes weak Pareto op-
timality if for all bargaining problems ðS;dÞ, fðS;dÞ is a subset of the
weakly e‰cient points in S. It satisﬁes Pareto optimality if for all bargain-
ing problems ðS;dÞ, fðS;dÞ is a subset of the e‰cient points in S.
Invariance. A bargaining solution satisﬁes invariance if whenever ðS0;d 0Þ is
obtained from the bargaining problem ðS;dÞ by means of the transfor-
mations si ! aisi þ bi, for i ¼ 1;2, where ai > 0 and bi A R, we have that
fiðS0;d 0Þ¼ai fiðS;dÞþbi, for i ¼ 1;2.
IIA. A bargaining solution f satisﬁes independence of irrelevant alternatives if
fðS0;dÞ¼fðS;dÞXS0 whenever S0 JS and fðS;dÞXS0 0q.
Since we do not require solutions to be single-valued, the above prop-
erties are not enough to characterize the Nash bargaining solution. In order
to establish what is essentially Nash’s characterization we need the following
property.
2 We adopt the following conventions for vector inequalities: xgy $ xi > yi for all i,
and xby $ xi byi for all i.
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single-valuedness in symmetric problems if for every symmetric problem
B A B, fðBÞ is a singleton.
As stated in the introduction, we shall replace the axiom of IIA by the fol-
lowing three independent properties:
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives. A bargaining solution
satisﬁes independence with respect to non-individually rational alternatives if
for every two problems ðS;dÞ and ðS0;dÞ such that IRðS;dÞ¼IRðS0;dÞ
we have fðS;dÞ¼fðS0;dÞ.
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives requires that the solu-
tion be insensitive to changes in the feasible set that do not involve individ-
ually rational outcomes. It clearly implies that the solution always chooses
a subset of the individually rational agreements. It can be checked that if a
solution always chooses a subset of the individually rational agreements and
also satisﬁes IIA then the solution satisﬁes independence of non-individually
rational alternatives. This axiom was ﬁrst discussed in Peters (1986a).
The following axiom says the following. Assume that the point ^ s s ¼ð ^ s s1;^ s s2Þ
is chosen by the solution when the problem is ðS;dÞ. Assume further that the
feasible set is modiﬁed so that all the subtracted points are preferred by one
player to ^ s s while ^ s s is preferred by the same player to each of the added points.
Then the axiom requires that ^ s s be weakly preferred by that same player to at
least one point selected by the solution in the new problem ðS0;dÞ.
Twisting. A bargaining solution f satisﬁes twisting if the following holds:
Let ðS;dÞ be a bargaining problem and let ð^ s s1;^ s s2Þ A fðS;dÞ. Let ðS0;dÞ be
another bargaining problem such that for some agent i ¼ 1;2
SnS0 Jfðs1;s2Þ : si > ^ s sig
S0nS Jfðs1;s2Þ : si < ^ s sig:
Then, there is ðs0
1;s0
2Þ A fðS0;dÞ such that s0
i a^ s si.
Twisting is a mild monotonicity condition, which was introduced (in its single-
valued version) by Thomson and Myerson (1980) who also showed that it
is implied by IIA. Twisting is satisﬁed by most solutions discussed in the
literature.
The next axiom was used in Peters and van Damme (1991). Thomson
(1994), who calls it star-shaped inverse, succinctly summarizes this axiom as
saying ‘‘that the move of the disagreement point in the direction of the desired
compromise does not call for a revision of this compromise’’.
Disagreement point convexity. A bargaining solution f satisﬁes disagree-
ment point convexity if for every bargaining problem B ¼ð S;dÞ, for all
s A fðS;dÞ and for every l A ð0;1Þ we have s A fðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ.
This axiom has a non-cooperative ﬂavor and it is related to one of the
properties of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games, namely
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game and ﬁx a Nash equilibrium s in it. For every node n in the tree, s deter-
mines an outcome, zðn;sÞ, which is the outcome that would result if s was
played in the subgame that starts at node n. In particular, s determines a Nash
equilibrium outcome zðn0;sÞ, where n0 denotes the root of the tree. Now,
zðn0;sÞ remains a Nash equilibrium outcome if we replace any given node n
by the outcome zðn;sÞ. This ‘‘tree folding property’’ is also satisﬁed by the
Subgame Perfect equilibrium concept. However, we want to stress that this
property is so basic that it is even satisﬁed by the Nash equilibrium concept.
The axiom of disagreement point convexity tries to capture the tree folding
property when applied to the subgame perfect equilibrium of a speciﬁc class
of bargaining games, which we turn to describe.
Many non-cooperative models of bargaining are represented by an
inﬁnite-horizon stationary extensive form game with common discount factor
d, Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating o¤ers model being the most prominent ex-
ample. Further, the solution concept used is subgame perfect equilibrium. All
these games have the following properties:
1. The disagreement outcome corresponds to the inﬁnite history in which the
current proposal is rejected at every period.
2. There is an agreement a  such that the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game dictates that a  is immediately agreed upon. Further,
a  is immediately agreed upon at every subgame that is equivalent to the
original game.
To see an application of the tree folding property to one such game, consider
a stationary extensive form bargaining game G with the properties 1 and 2
above3 and ﬁx a period t. Assume that at period t the proposer is the same one
as in the ﬁrst period so that all subgames that start at the beginning of period
t are identical to G. Build a new game by replacing each subgame of G that
starts at the beginning of period t by the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
of that subgame. (Note that an outcome will typically have the format of ‘‘dis-
agreement until period t0 and agreement a at t0’’.4). By property 2 above, this
outcome is ‘‘disagreement until period t, and agreement a  at t’’. The resulting
game, GðtÞ, is a ﬁnite horizon extensive form game in which a history of con-
stant rejections leads to a  at period t. That is, in this new game disagreement
leads to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome a , but delayed by t periods
during which there is disagreement. Still, the subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come of this modiﬁed game GðtÞ is an immediate agreement on a , which is
what the tree folding property says.
Going back to the cooperative bargaining problem, let d be the present
value of the utility stream of disagreement forever, and let s be the vector of
3 The reader may ﬁnd it convenient to consider Rubinstein’s (1982) game.
4 We have in mind bargaining over a per-period payo¤ rather than over a stock. Both
approaches are equivalent since every constant ﬂow is equivalent to a stock and vice
versa.
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agreement point ð1   lÞd þ ls in the disagreement point convexity axiom cor-
responds precisely to the disagreement outcome of the amended game GðtÞ,
l being d
t. To see this, note that the present value of a stream of t periods
of disagreement and then agreement on a  at t is ð1   d
tÞdi þ d
tsi for player i,
for i ¼ 1;2.5 Using this interpretation, disagreement point convexity simply
says that if we amend the bargaining problem so that the consequence of no
agreement is that players disagree for t periods, and receive fðS;dÞ afterwards
(yielding a payo¤ of ð1   d
tÞd þ d
tfðS;dÞ), then they should agree on fðS;dÞ
to be paid from the outset. Note that for the disagreement point to move
along the segment that connects d and s when we replace the subgame with its
equilibrium outcome, it is essential to assume a common discount factor.
Disagreement point convexity seems to be an appropriate requirement,
especially if one has in mind a stationary bargaining game. Dagan et al. (1999)
exploit this axiom to give a characterization of the time-preference Nash solu-
tion in a setting with physical outcomes.6
3 The main result
We can now present the main result.
Theorem 1. A bargaining solution satisﬁes weak Pareto optimality, symmetry,
invariance, single-valuedness in symmetric problems, independence with respect
to non-individually rational allocations, twisting, and disagreement point con-
vexity if and only if it is the Nash bargaining solution.
Proof. It is known that the Nash solution satisﬁes weak Pareto optimality,
symmetry, invariance and single-valuedness in symmetric problems (see Nash
1950). By its deﬁnition, the Nash solution also satisﬁes independence of non-
individually rational alternatives. Also, the Nash solution satisﬁes twisting,
since twisting is weaker than IIA (see Thomson and Myerson 1980 or the Ap-
pendix for the set valued version used here), which is in turn satisﬁed by the
Nash solution. Finally, Peters and van Damme (1991) showed that it also sat-
isﬁes disagreement point convexity. This shows that the Nash solution satisﬁes
all the axioms in the theorem. We now show that no other solution satisﬁes all
of them together. Suppose that a solution f satisﬁes all the axioms.
First step. Consider ﬁrst a triangular problem ðS;dÞ where S ¼ cofðd1;d2Þ;
ðb1;d2Þ;ðd1;b2Þg with bi > di for i ¼ 1;2, and for any set AJR2,c oA is the
convex hull of A. Since there are a‰ne transformations by means of which
ðS;dÞ is obtained from ðcofð0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð0;1Þg;ð0;0ÞÞ1ðI;ð0;0ÞÞ and since
5 If one considers a model without impatience but where after each rejected o¤er there
is a probability 1   d of negotiations breakdown, resulting in d, then ð1   d
tÞd þ d
ts is
the expected utility pair associated with a history of agreement on a  after t rejections.
6 See Binmore et al. (1986) for the di¤erence between what they call the standard and
the time-preference Nash solutions.
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if fðI;ð0;0ÞÞ ¼ nðI;ð0;0ÞÞ. But by single-valuedness in symmetric problems,
weak Pareto optimality and symmetry of f we know that fðI;ð0;0ÞÞ ¼
fð1=2;1=2Þg ¼ nðI;ð0;0ÞÞ.
Second step. Consider a general bargaining problem ðS;dÞ and let ^ s s A fðS;dÞ.
Since both n and f satisfy independence of non-individually rational alterna-
tives, we can assume without loss of generality that IRðS;dÞ¼S.
Case 1. ^ s sgd: In this case, by invariance we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that d ¼ð 0;0Þ and ^ s s ¼ð 1=2;1=2Þ. It is enough to show that ^ s s A nðS;dÞ.
Assume by contradiction that ^ s s B nðS;dÞ and consider the triangular problem
ðcofð0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð0;1Þg;ð0;0ÞÞ ¼ ðI;ð0;0ÞÞ. We know that nðI;ð0;0ÞÞ ¼ f^ s sg.
Since n satisﬁes IIA, we have that SUI. That is there exists s  ¼ð s 
1;s 
2Þ A
SnI. By weak Pareto optimality of f, ^ s s is a weakly e‰cient point of S. There-
fore it cannot be the case that s  g^ s s. Also, we cannot have s  a^ s s because
otherwise s  would be in I. Therefore, either s 
1 > ^ s s1 or s 
2 > ^ s s2. Assume with-
out loss of generality that s 
1 > ^ s s1 and s 
2 < ^ s s2 (if s 
1 > ^ s s1 and s 
2 ¼ ^ s s2, then there
must be another point s   ¼ð s  
1 ;s  
2 Þ A SnI, close enough to s  with s  
1 > ^ s s1
and s  
2 < ^ s s2). Also, since any convex combination of s  and ^ s s is in SnI,w e
can choose s  gd. We now build two bargaining problems, both of which
have ðs 
2;s 
2Þ as disagreement point. The ﬁrst problem is ðS0;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ, where
S0 ¼ IRðS;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ. The second problem is the individually rational region
of the triangle whose hypothenuse is the line connecting s  and ^ s s (see
Fig. 1). Formally, the problem is ðD;ðs 
2;s 










^ s s2 s 
2
s 
1 ^ s s1 ðs 




By disagreement point convexity and independence of non-individually
rational alternatives of f, we have
^ s s ¼ð 1=2;1=2Þ A fðS0;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ: ð1Þ
Further, we claim that
S0nDJfðs1;s2Þ A R2 : s1 > ^ s s1g and DnS0 Jfðs1;s2Þ A R2 : s1 < ^ s s1g:
Indeed, if there was a point ðs1;s2Þ A S0nD with s1 a^ s s1 ¼ 1=2, then we would
have that ðs1;s2Þ is above the straight line that connects ^ s s and s . Therefore,
the line segment that connects ðs1;s2Þ with s  is also above this line. But then,
there would be a point in this segment which belongs to S and which domi-
nates ^ s s, which is impossible given that ^ s s is a weakly e‰cient point of S. Simi-
larly, if there was a point ðs1;s2Þ A DnS0 with s1 b^ s s1, then ðs1;s2Þ would be
on or below the straight line that connects ^ s s and s . Therefore, it would be a
convex combination of ^ s s, s  and ðs 
2;s 
2Þ. Since the three points are in S0,s o
would ðs1;s2Þ, which contradicts the fact that ðs1;s2Þ B S0.
Therefore, by twisting of f we have




s1 a^ s s1 ¼ 1=2: ð2Þ
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2;s 
2ÞÞ is a triangular problem, by the ﬁrst step
in the proof fðD;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ ¼ nðD;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ which implies that
fðD;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ ¼ fðs1;s2Þg ¼ nðD;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ:
By construction of D, the Nash solution awards player 1 in ðD;ðs 
2;s 
2ÞÞ more
than 1/2, that is
s1 > 1=2
which contradicts (2).
Case 2. ^ s s6gd: Again, without loss of generality assume d ¼ð 0;0Þ. In this
case either ^ s s ¼ð b1;0Þ or ^ s s ¼ð 0;b2Þ. Assume without loss of generality that
^ s s ¼ð 0;b2Þ with b2 > 0. Pick any l A ð0;1Þ and let SðlÞ¼IRðS;l^ s sÞ. Since l^ s s
is an interior point of S in the space R2
þ, we can ﬁnd a triangular set D ¼
cofl^ s s;^ s s;ðc1;l^ s s2Þg that is contained in SðlÞ. Consider now the following two
bargaining problems: ðSðlÞ;l^ s sÞ and ðD;l^ s sÞ (see Fig. 2).
By disagreement point convexity and independence of non-individually
rational alternatives fðSðlÞ;l^ s sÞ¼^ s s¼ð0;b2Þ. Since ðD;l^ s sÞ is a triangular prob-
lem, by the ﬁrst step in the proof we have
fðD;l^ s sÞ¼nðD;l^ s sÞ¼ð s0
1;s0
2Þgð0;0Þ: ð3Þ
By construction, we have
SðlÞnDJfðs1;s2Þ : s1 > ^ s s1g and DnSðlÞJfðs1;s2Þ : s1 < ^ s s1g:
Therefore, by twisting we must have s0
1 a^ s s1 ¼ 0 which contradicts Eq. 3. r
Fig. 1. The two auxiliary problems
818 N. Dagan et al.Remark. It should be clear that the statement of the theorem still holds if we
restrict attention to the family of bargaining problems ðS;dÞ that are compre-
hensive with respect to d. Namely, those bargaining problems ðS;dÞ such that
if sbs0 bd and s A S, then s0 A S.
4 Independence of the axioms
The following examples show that the seven axioms used in the characteriza-
tion are independent. Beside each axiom there is a solution that fails to satisfy
that axiom but which satisﬁes the other six.
Weak Pareto optimality. The disagreement point solution: f : ðS;dÞ!f dg.
Symmetry. Any asymmetric Nash solution.
Invariance. The Lexicographic Egalitarian solution (see, Chun and Peters
1988).
Single-valuedness in symmetric problems. The set of weakly e‰cient and indi-
vidually rational points.
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives. The Kalai-Rosenthal
solution: it selects the maximal point of S in the segment connecting d and
bðS;dÞ, where biðS;dÞ1maxfxi : x A Sg (see Kalai and Rosenthal 1978).
Twisting. If B can be obtained by means of a pair of a‰ne transformations
from a bargaining problem B0 ¼ð S0;d 0Þ, where d 0 ¼ð 0;0Þ and IRðB0Þ¼
cofð0;0Þ;ð1;0Þ;ð1=3;2=3Þg, then fðBÞ is the point that is obtained by
means of these transformations from ð1=3;2=3Þ. Otherwise, f coincides
with the Nash bargaining solution.
Fig. 2. Case 2
The Nash bargaining solution 819Disagreement point convexity. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution: it
selects the maximal point of S in the segment connecting d and aðS;dÞ,
where aiðS;dÞ1maxfxi : x A IRðS;dÞg (see, Kalai and Smorodinsky
1975).
The reader may have noticed that we could have restricted solutions
to be single valued instead of imposing single-valuedness in symmetric prob-
lems as an axiom. We chose this presentation to highlight the role of single-
valuedness. There are many bargaining solutions that satisfy all the axioms
except for single-valuedness. As mentioned above, the set of e‰cient and in-
dividually rational outcomes is one example but there are many more. For
instance, if f a is the asymmetric Nash solution that maximizes the asym-
metric Nash product sa
1s1 a
2 , for a A ð0;1Þ, then the solution that selects
for every ðS;dÞ, the set f aðS;dÞW f 1 aðS;dÞ also satisﬁes all the axioms ex-
cept for single-valuedness. Further, it can be easily checked that if ffgggAG
is a family of bargaining solutions that satisfy weak Pareto optimality, sym-
metry, invariance, independence of non-individually rational outcomes, twist-
ing and disagreement point convexity, then the solution 6gAG fg deﬁned by
ð6gAG fgÞðS;dÞ¼6gAG fgðS;dÞ satisﬁes these axioms as well. Moreover, the
set of e‰cient and individually rational points is the maximal (in the sense of
set inclusion) bargaining solution that satisﬁes the above axioms. It is single-
valued in symmetric problems what allows us to select the Nash bargaining
solution out of the large family of solutions that satisfy the other axioms,
including symmetry.
We also should note that the axioms of independence of non-individually
rational alternatives, twisting and disagreement point convexity that we use to
replace IIA, do not imply the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom:
the solution that selects the disagreement point if the feasible set is a line seg-
ment and the Nash outcome otherwise, satisﬁes all the three axioms (in fact,
satisﬁes all the axioms except for weak Pareto optimality) but does not satisfy
IIA.
5 Related literature
This paper provides a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution on
Nash’s original domain of bargaining problems, and in which the indepen-
dence axiom is replaced by three other axioms. Our result is closely related to
Peters and van Damme (1991) and our contribution can be seen as eliminat-
ing of continuity axioms from the characterization. Continuity has been re-
placed by twisting, a mild axiom that, to our knowledge, is satisﬁed by most
solution concepts discussed in the literature (the Perles-Maschler solution is
one exception). Other characterizations of the Nash solution that use similar
axioms, but still need continuity, are Peters (1986b) and Chun and Thomson
(1990). Mariotti (1999) also provides a characterization of the Nash solution
without appealing to IIA, but, as opposed to the other mentioned papers,
820 N. Dagan et al.he reduces the number of axioms. In fact, there are only two characterizing
axioms: invariance and Suppes-Sen proofness. The same can be said about
Mariotti (2000) who replaces IIA and symmetry by strong individual ratio-
nality and the axiom of Maximal Symmetry.
Chun and Thomson (1990) characterize the Nash bargaining solution
using two axioms, along with Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale-invariance,
independence of non-individually rational outcomes, and a continuity axiom.
The two axioms, which capture features of bargaining with uncertain dis-
agreement points can be stated as follows:7
R.D.LIN. A single-valued bargaining solution f satisﬁes restricted dis-
agreement point linearity if for every two problems ðS;dÞ and ðS;d 0Þ, and for
all a A ½0;1 ,i fafðS;dÞþð 1   aÞfðS;d 0Þ is e‰cient and S is smooth both at
fðS;dÞ and fðS;d 0Þ, then fðS;ad þð 1   aÞd 0Þ¼afðS;dÞþð 1   aÞfðS;d 0Þ.
D.Q-CAV. A single-valued bargaining solution f satisﬁes disagreement
point quasi-concavity if for every two problems ðS;dÞ and ðS;d 0Þ, and for all
a A ½0;1 , fiðS;ad þð 1   aÞd 0ÞbminffiðS;dÞ; fiðS;d 0Þg for i ¼ 1;2.
We now investigate the relation between these two axioms and disagree-
ment point convexity.
Claim 1. If a single-valued bargaining solution, f, satisﬁes Pareto optimality,
independence of non-individually rational alternatives and D.Q-CAV., then it
also satisﬁes disagreement point convexity.
Proof. Let ðS;dÞ be a bargaining problem and let s ¼ fðS;dÞ.
Let l A ð0;1Þ and assume that fðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ0s. Since f satisﬁes
Pareto optimality, fiðS;dÞ > fiðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ for some i ¼ 1;2, which,
without loss of generality, can be taken to be agent 1. Therefore, we can
ﬁnd an a A ð0;1Þ close enough to 1 such that the point d 0 ¼ð 1   aÞd þ as
satisﬁes d 0
1 > f1ðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ. Since f satisﬁes individual rationality,
f1ðS;d 0Þ > f1ðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ. This inequality, together with f1ðS;dÞ >
f1ðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ imply minff1ðS;dÞ; f1ðS;d 0Þg > f1ðS;ð1   lÞd þ lsÞ.B y
the way d 0 was chosen, we know that ð1   lÞd þ ls is a convex combination
of d and d 0 and consequently the above inequality implies that f does not
satisfy D.Q-CAV. r
As a corollary, we have that we could replace weak Pareto optimality and
disagreement point convexity in our characterization by Pareto optimality and
D.Q-CAV.
The relationship between disagreement point convexity and R.D.LIN. is
not so clear, at least within the domain of problems considered in this paper.
However, Pareto optimality, independence of non-individually rational alter-
natives and R.D.LIN. imply disagreement point convexity within the domain
7 Chun and Thomson (1990) deﬁne bargaining solutions as single-valued functions
that select points from the set of feasible utilities. To facilitate comparison in what re-
mains of this section, we use the single-valued versions of the axioms, including dis-
agreement point convexity.
The Nash bargaining solution 821of bargaining problems with smooth Pareto frontiers provided we enlarge
the deﬁnition of bargaining problems to include those pairs ðS;dÞ with e‰-
cient disagreement points.8 To see this, consider a bargaining problem ðS;dÞ
in this domain and let f be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes Pareto opti-
mality, independence of non-individually rational alternatives and R.D.LIN.
By Pareto optimality, we have that fðS;dÞ is e‰cient. By independence of
non-individually rational alternatives, we have that fðS; fðS;dÞÞ ¼ fðS;dÞ.
Since the e‰cient frontier is smooth, we can apply R.D.LIN. to conclude that
fðS;ð1   lÞd þ lfðS;dÞÞ ¼ fðS;dÞ for all l A ð0;1Þ. This means that f sat-
isﬁes disagreement point convexity.
The Nash solution is not deﬁned for the above domain. However, one can
extend it, as Peters and van Damme (1991) do, so as to select the only e‰cient
and individually rational point when the disagreement point is weakly e‰-
cient. In this case, our characterization goes through and the axioms of weak
Pareto optimality and disagreement point convexity can, as a corollary of the
observation of the previous paragraph, be replaced by Pareto optimality and
R.D.LIN.
Our characterization is on Nash’s original domain. In particular, we re-
strict attention to two-person bargaining problems. It is not clear whether the
same axioms are su‰cient to fully characterize the Nash bargaining solution
for general n-person bargaining problems. The Nash bargaining solution does
satisfy all the axioms. However, our proof makes use of the 2-dimensionality
of the problem. In particular, when there are more than 3 players, it is not
clear how to build the auxiliary set D with the critical properties used in Step 2
of our proof.
Appendix
In this Appendix we show that the set valued version of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives axiom that we use implies twisting. Formally:
Claim 2. If a bargaining solution satisﬁes independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, then it also satisﬁes twisting.
Proof. Let ðS;dÞ be a bargaining problem and let ^ s s A fðS;dÞ. Let ðS0;dÞ be
another bargaining problem such that for some agent i ¼ 1;2
SnS0 Jfðs1;s2Þ : si > ^ s sigð 4Þ
S0nS Jfðs1;s2Þ : si < ^ s sig: ð5Þ
We need to show that there is ðs0
1;s0
2Þ A fðS0;dÞ such that s0
i a^ s si. Assume now
by contradiction that
fðS0;dÞJfðs1;s2Þ : si > ^ s sigð 6Þ
8 Peters and van Damme (1991) consider a domain of problems that contains pairs
ðS;dÞ where d is an e‰cient point of S.
822 N. Dagan et al.and let ^ S S ¼ S XS0. Since ^ s s A fðS;dÞX ^ S S, we have by IIA that
^ s s A fð^ S S;dÞ: ð7Þ
Further, fðS0;dÞXS 0q, for if fðS0;dÞJS0nS, then by (5), fðS0;dÞJ
fðs1;s2Þ : si < ^ s sig which was assumed in (6) not to be true. Therefore, q0
fðS0;dÞXS JS0 XS ¼ ^ S S. This implies that fðS0;dÞX ^ S S 0q and ^ S S JS0.
Then, by IIA fð^ S S;dÞ¼fðS0;dÞX ^ S S. But then, since by (7), ^ s s A fð^ S S;dÞ,w e
have that ^ s s A fðS0;dÞ, which by (6) implies that ^ s si > ^ s si, which is absurd. r
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